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Abstract
Collaborative machine learning and related techniques such as
federated learning allow multiple participants, each with his
own training dataset, to build a joint model by training lo-
cally and periodically exchanging model updates. We demon-
strate that these updates leak unintended information about
participants’ training data and develop passive and active in-
ference attacks to exploit this leakage. First, we show that
an adversarial participant can infer the presence of exact data
points—for example, specific locations—in others’ training
data (i.e., membership inference). Then, we show how this
adversary can infer properties that hold only for a subset of
the training data and are independent of the properties that the
joint model aims to capture. For example, he can infer when a
specific person first appears in the photos used to train a binary
gender classifier. We evaluate our attacks on a variety of tasks,
datasets, and learning configurations, analyze their limitations,
and discuss possible defenses.
1 Introduction
Collaborative machine learning (ML) has recently emerged
as an alternative to conventional ML methodologies where
all training data is pooled and the model is trained on this
joint pool. It allows two or more participants, each with his
own training dataset, to construct a joint model. Each par-
ticipant trains a local model on his own data and periodically
exchanges model parameters, updates to these parameters, or
partially constructed models with the other participants.
Several architectures have been proposed for distributed,
collaborative, and federated learning [9, 11, 33, 38, 62, 68]:
with and without a central server, with different ways of ag-
gregating models, etc. The main goal is to improve the train-
ing speed and reduce overheads, but protecting privacy of the
participants’ training data is also an important motivation for
several recently proposed techniques [35, 52]. Because the
training data never leave the participants’ machines, collabo-
rative learning may be a good match for the scenarios where
this data is sensitive (e.g., health-care records, private images,
personally identifiable information, etc.). Compelling applica-
tions include training of predictive keyboards on character se-
quences that users type on their smartphones [35], or using data
from multiple hospitals to develop predictive models for pa-
tient survival [29] and side effects of medical treatments [30].
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Collaborative training, however, does disclose information
via model updates that are based on the training data. The key
question we investigate in this paper is: what can be inferred
about a participant’s training dataset from the model up-
dates revealed during collaborative model training?
Of course, the purpose of ML is to discover new information
about the data. Any useful ML model reveals something about
the population from which the training data was drawn. For
example, in addition to accurately classifying its inputs, a clas-
sifier model may reveal the features that characterize a given
class or help construct data points that belong to this class. In
this paper, we focus on inferring “unintended” features, i.e.,
properties that hold for certain subsets of the training data, but
not generically for all class members.
The basic privacy violation in this setting is membership in-
ference: given an exact data point, determine if it was used to
train the model. Prior work described passive and active mem-
bership inference attacks against ML models [24, 53], but col-
laborative learning presents interesting new avenues for such
inferences. For example, we show that an adversarial partici-
pant can infer whether a specific location profile was used to
train a gender classifier on the FourSquare location dataset [64]
with 0.99 precision and perfect recall.
We then investigate passive and active property inference
attacks that allow an adversarial participant in collaborative
learning to infer properties of other participants’ training data
that are not true of the class as a whole, or even independent of
the features that characterize the classes of the joint model. We
also study variations such as inferring when a property appears
and disappears in the data during training—for example, iden-
tifying when a certain person first appears in the photos used
to train a generic gender classifier.
For a variety of datasets and ML tasks, we demonstrate
successful inference attacks against two-party and multi-party
collaborative learning based on [52] and multi-party federated
learning based on [35]. For example, when the model is trained
on the LFW dataset [28] to recognize gender or race, we infer
whether people in the training photos wear glasses—a property
that is uncorrelated with the main task. By contrast, prior prop-
erty inference attacks [2, 25] infer only properties that charac-
terize an entire class. We discuss this critical distinction in
detail in Section 3.
Our key observation, concretely illustrated by our experi-
ments, is that modern deep-learning models come up with sep-
arate internal representations of all kinds of features, some of
which are independent of the task being learned. These “unin-
tended” features leak information about participants’ training
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data. We also demonstrate that an active adversary can use
multi-task learning to trick the joint model into learning a bet-
ter internal separation of the features that are of interest to him
and thus extract even more information.
Some of our inference attacks have direct privacy implica-
tions. For example, when training a binary gender classifier on
the FaceScrub [40] dataset, we infer with high accuracy (0.9
AUC score) that a certain person appears in a single training
batch even if half of the photos in the batch depict other peo-
ple. When training a generic sentiment analysis model on Yelp
healthcare-related reviews, we infer the specialty of the doctor
being reviewed with perfect accuracy. On another set of Yelp
reviews, we identify the author even if their reviews account
for less than a third of the batch.
We also measure the performance of our attacks vis-a`-vis
the number of participants (see Section 7). On the image-
classification tasks, AUC degrades once the number of par-
ticipants exceeds a dozen or so. On sentiment-analysis tasks
with Yelp reviews, AUC of author identification remains high
for many authors even with 30 participants.
Federated learning with model averaging [35] does not re-
veal individual gradient updates, greatly reducing the informa-
tion available to the adversary. We demonstrate successful at-
tacks even in this setting, e.g., inferring that photos of a certain
person appear in the training data.
Finally, we evaluate possible defenses—sharing fewer
gradients, reducing the dimensionality of the input space,
dropout—and find that they do not effectively thwart our at-
tacks. We also attempt to use participant-level different pri-
vacy [36], which, however, is geared to work with thousands
of users, and the joint model fails to converge in our setting.
2 Background
2.1 Machine learning (ML)
An ML model is a function fθ : X 7→ Y parameterized by
a set of parameters θ, where X denotes the input (or feature)
space, and Y the output space.
In this paper, we focus on the supervised learning of classi-
fication tasks. The training data is a set of data points labeled
with their correct classes. We work with models that take as in-
put images or text (i.e., sequences of words) and output a class
label. To find the optimal set of parameters that fits the train-
ing data, the training algorithm optimizes the objective (loss)
function, which penalizes the model when it outputs a wrong
label on a data point. We use L(x, y; θ) to denote the loss com-
puted on a data point (x, y) given the model parameters θ, and
L(b; θ) to denote the average loss computed on a batch b of
data points.
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD). There are many methods
to optimize the objective function. Stochastic gradient descent
(SGD) and its variants are commonly used to train artificial
neural networks, but our inference methodology is not specific
to SGD. SGD is an iterative method where at each step the
optimizer receives a small batch of the training data and up-
dates the model parameters θ according to the direction of the
Algorithm 1 Parameter server with synchronized SGD
Server executes:
Initialize θ0
for t = 1 to T do
for each client k do
gkt ←ClientUpdate(θt−1)
end for
θt ← θt−1 − η∑k gkt . synchronized gradient updates
end for
ClientUpdate(θ):
Select batch b from client’s data
return local gradients∇L(b; θ)
negative gradient of the objective function with respect to θ
and scaled by the learning rate η. Training finishes when the
model has converged to a local minimum, where the gradient is
close to zero. The trained model is tested using held-out data,
which was not used during training. A standard metric is test
accuracy, i.e., the percentage of held-out data points that are
classified correctly.
Hyperparameters. Most modern ML algorithms have a set of
tunable hyperparameters, distinct from the model parameters.
They control the number of training iterations, the ratio of the
regularization term in the loss function (its purpose is to pre-
vent overfitting, i.e., a modeling error that occurs when a func-
tion is too closely fitted to a limited set of data points), the size
of the training batches, etc.
Deep learning (DL). A family of ML models known as
deep learning recently became very popular for many ML
tasks, especially related to computer vision and image recog-
nition [32, 51]. DL models are made of layers of non-linear
mappings from input to intermediate hidden states and then to
output. Each connection between layers has a floating-point
weight matrix as parameters. These weights are updated dur-
ing training. The topology of the connections between layers
is task-dependent and important for the accuracy of the model.
2.2 Collaborative learning
Training a deep neural network on a large dataset can be
time- and resource-consuming. A common scaling approach
is to partition the training dataset, concurrently train separate
models on each subset, and exchange parameters via a param-
eter server [9, 11]. During training, each local model pulls the
parameters from this server, calculates the updates based on its
current batch of training data, then pushes these updates back
to the server, which updates the global parameters.
Collaborative learning may also involve participants who
want to hide their training data from each other. We review
two architectures for privacy-preserving collaborative learning
based on, respectively, [52] and [35].
Collaborative learning with synchronized gradient
updates. Algorithm 1 shows collaborative learning with
synchronized gradient updates [52]. In every iteration of
training, each participant downloads the global model from
the parameter server, locally computes gradient updates based
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Algorithm 2 Federated learning with model averaging
Server executes:
Initialize θ0
m← max(C ·K, 1)
for t = 1 to T do
St ← (random set of m clients)
for each client k ∈ St do
θkt ←ClientUpdate(θt−1)
end for
θt ←∑k nkn θkt . averaging local models
end for
ClientUpdate(θ):
for each local iteration do
for each batch b in client’s split do
θ ← θ − η∇L(b; θ)
end for
end for
return local model θ
on one batch of his training data, and sends the updates to
the server. The server waits for the gradient updates from all
participants and then applies the aggregated updates to the
global model using stochastic gradient descent (SGD).
In [52], each client may share only a fraction of his gradi-
ents. We evaluate if this mitigates our attacks in Section 8.1.
Furthermore, [52] suggests differential privacy to protect gra-
dient updates. We do not include differential privacy in our
experiments. By definition, record-level differential privacy
bounds the success of membership inference, but does not
prevent property inference that applies to a group of train-
ing records. Participant-level differential privacy, on the other
hand, bounds the success of all attacks considered in this pa-
per, but we are not aware of any participant-level differential
privacy mechanism that enables collaborative learning of an
accurate model with a small number of participants. We dis-
cuss this further in Section 8.4.
Federated learning with model averaging. Algorithm 2
shows the federated learning algorithm [35]. We set C, the
fraction of the participants who update the model in each
round, to 1 (i.e., the server takes updates from all participants),
to simplify our experiments and because we ignore the effi-
ciency of the learning protocol when analyzing the leakage.
In each round, the k-th participant locally takes several steps
of SGD on the current model using his entire training dataset
of size nk (i.e., the globally visible updates are based not on
batches but on participants’ entire datasets). In Algorithm 2, n
is the total size of the training data, i.e., the sum of all nk. Each
participant submits the resulting model to the server, which
computes a weighted average. The server evaluates the result-
ing joint model on a held-out dataset and stops training when
performance stops improving.
The convergence rate of both collaborative learning ap-
proaches heavily depends on the learning task and the hyper-
parameters (e.g., number of participants and batch size).
3 Reasoning about Privacy in Machine
Learning
If a machine learning (ML) model is useful, it must reveal
information about the data on which it was trained [13]. To
argue that the training process and/or the resulting model vi-
olate “privacy,” it is not enough to show that the adversary
learns something new about the training inputs. At the very
least, the adversary must learn more about the training inputs
than about other members of their respective classes. To posi-
tion our contributions in the context of related work (surveyed
in Section 10) and motivate the need to study unintended fea-
ture leakage, we discuss several types of adversarial inference
previously considered in the research literature.
3.1 Inferring class representatives
Given black-box access to a classifier model, model inver-
sion attacks [16] infer features that characterize each class,
making it possible to construct representatives of these classes.
In the special case—and only in this special case—where
all class members are similar, the results of model inversion are
similar to the training data. For example, in a facial recognition
model where each class corresponds to a single individual, all
class members depict the same person. Therefore, the outputs
of model inversion are visually similar to any image of that
person, including the training photos. If the class members are
not all visually similar, the results of model inversion do not
look like the training data [53].
If the adversary actively participates in training the model
(as in the collaborative and federated learning scenarios con-
sidered in this paper), he can use GANs [22] to construct class
representatives, as done by Hitaj et al. [25]. Only in the special
case where all class members are similar, GAN-constructed
representatives are similar to the training data. For example, all
handwritten images of the digit ‘9’ are visually similar. There-
fore, a GAN-constructed image for the ‘9’ class looks similar
to any image of digit 9, including the training images. In a fa-
cial recognition model, too, all class members depict the same
person. Hence, a GAN-constructed face looks similar to any
image of that person, including the training photos.
Note that neither technique reconstructs actual training in-
puts. In fact, there is no evidence that GANs, as used in [25],
can even distinguish between a training input and a random
member of the same class.
Data points produced by model inversion and GANs are
similar to the training inputs only if all class members are sim-
ilar, as is the case for MNIST (the dataset of handwritten digits
used in [25]) and facial recognition. This simply shows that
ML works as it should. A trained classifier reveals the input
features characteristic of each class, thus enabling the adver-
sary to sample from the class population. For instance, Fig-
ure 1 shows GAN-constructed images for the gender classifi-
cation task on the LFW dataset, which we use in our experi-
ments (see Section 6). These images show a generic female
face, but there is no way to tell from them whether an image of
a specific female was used in training or not.
Finally, the active attack in [25] works by overfitting the
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Figure 1: Samples from a GAN attack on a gender classification
model where the class is “female.”
joint model’s representation of a class to a single participant’s
training data. This assumes that the entire training corpus for
a given class belongs to that participant. We are not aware of
any deployment scenario for collaborative learning where this
is the case. By contrast, we focus on a more realistic scenario
where the training data for each class are distributed across
multiple participants, although there may be significant differ-
ences between their datasets.
3.2 Inferring membership in training data
The (arguably) simplest privacy breach is, given a model and
an exact data point, inferring whether this point was used to
train the model or not. Membership inference attacks against
aggregate statistics are well-known [14, 27, 50], and recent
work demonstrated black-box membership inference against
ML models [24, 34, 53, 58], as discussed in Section 10.
The ability of an adversary to infer the presence of a spe-
cific data point in a training dataset constitutes an immediate
privacy threat if the dataset is in itself sensitive. For example,
if a model was trained on the records of patients with a certain
disease, learning that an individual’s record was among them
directly affects his or her privacy. Membership inference can
also help demonstrate inappropriate uses of data (e.g., using
health-care records to train ML models for unauthorized pur-
poses [4]), enforce individual rights such as the “right to be
forgotten,” and/or detect violations of data-protection regula-
tions such as the GDPR [19]. Collaborative learning presents
interesting new avenues for such inferences.
3.3 Inferring properties of training data
In collaborative and federated learning, participants’ train-
ing data may not be identically distributed. Federated learning
is explicitly designed to take advantage of the fact that partici-
pants may have private training data that are different from the
publicly available data for the same class [35].
Prior work [2, 16, 25] aimed to infer properties that char-
acterize an entire class: for example, given a face recognition
model where one of the classes is Bob, infer what Bob looks
like (e.g., Bob wears glasses). It is not clear that hiding this
information in a good classifier is possible or desirable.
By contrast, we aim to infer properties that are true of a sub-
set of the training inputs but not of the class as a whole. For
instance, when Bob’s photos are used to train a gender clas-
sifier, we infer that Alice appears in some of the photos. We
especially focus on the properties that are independent of the
class’s characteristic features. In contrast to the face recog-
nition example, where “Bob wears glasses” is a characteristic
feature of an entire class, in our gender classifier study we in-
fer whether people in Bob’s photos wear glasses—even though
wearing glasses has no correlation with gender. There is no le-
gitimate reason for a model to leak this information; it is purely
an artifact of the learning process.
A participant’s contribution to each iteration of collabora-
tive learning is based on a batch of his training data. We in-
fer single-batch properties, i.e., detect that the data in a given
batch has the property but other batches do not. We also infer
when a property appears in the training data. This has serious
privacy implications. For instance, we can infer when a certain
person starts appearing in a participant’s photos or when the
participant starts visiting a certain type of doctors. Finally, we
infer properties that characterize a participant’s entire dataset
(but not the entire class), e.g., authorship of the texts used to
train a sentiment-analysis model.
4 Inference Attacks
4.1 Threat model
We assume that K participants (where K ≥ 2) jointly train
an ML model using one of the collaborative learning algo-
rithms described in Section 2.2. One of the participants is the
adversary. His goal is to infer information about the training
data of another, target participant by analyzing periodic up-
dates to the joint model during training. Multi-party (K > 2)
collaborative learning also involves honest participants who
are neither the adversary, nor the target. In the multi-party
case, the identities of the participants may not be known to the
adversary. Even if the identities are known but the models are
aggregated, the adversary may infer something about the train-
ing data but not trace it to a specific participant; we discuss this
further in Section 9.4.
The updates that adversary observes and uses for inference
depend on both K and how collaborative training is done.
As inputs to his inference algorithms, the adversary uses the
model updates revealed in each round of collaborative train-
ing. For synchronized SGD [52] with K = 2, the adversary
observes gradient updates computed on a single batch of the
target’s data. If K > 2, he observes an aggregation of gra-
dient updates from all other participants (each computed on a
single batch of the respective participant’s data). For federated
learning with model averaging [35], the observed updates are
the result of two-step aggregation: (1) every participant aggre-
gates the gradients computed on each local batch, and (2) the
server aggregates the updates from all participants.
For property inference, the adversary needs auxiliary train-
ing data correctly labeled with the property he wants to infer
(e.g., faces labeled with ages if the goal is to infer ages). For
active property inference (Section 4.5), these auxiliary data
points must also be labeled for the main task (e.g., faces la-
beled with identities for a facial recognition model).
4.2 Overview of the attacks
Figure 2 provides a high-level overview of our inference
attacks. At each iteration t of training, the adversary down-
loads the current joint model, calculates gradient updates as
prescribed by the collaborative learning algorithm, and sends
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Figure 2: Overview of inference attacks against collaborative learning.
his own updates to the server. The adversary saves the snap-
shot of the joint model parameters θt. The difference between
the consecutive snapshots ∆θt = θt − θt−1 =
∑
k ∆θ
k
t is
equal to the aggregated updates from all participants, hence
∆θt − ∆θadvt are the aggregated updates from all participants
other than the adversary.
Leakage from the embedding layer. All deep learning mod-
els operating on non-numeric data where the input space is
discrete and sparse (e.g., natural-language text or locations)
first use an embedding layer to transform inputs into a lower-
dimensional vector representation. For convenience, we use
word to denote discrete tokens, i.e., actual words or specific
locations. Let vocabulary V be the set of all words. Each word
in the training data is mapped to a word-embedding vector via
an embedding matrix Wemb ∈ R|V |×d, where |V | is the size of
the vocabulary and d is the dimensionality of the embedding.
During training, the embedding matrix is treated as a pa-
rameter of the model and optimized collaboratively. The gra-
dient of the embedding layer is sparse with respect to the input
words: given a batch of text, the embedding is updated only
with the words that appear in the batch. The gradients of the
other words are zeros. This difference directly reveals which
words occur in the training batches used by the honest partici-
pants during collaborative learning.
Leakage from the gradients. In deep learning models, gra-
dients are computed by back-propagating the loss through the
entire network from the last to the first layer. Gradients of a
given layer are computed using this layer’s features and the
error from the layer above. In the case of sequential fully con-
nected layers hl, hl+1 (hl+1 = Wl ·hl, where Wl is the weight
matrix), the gradient of errorE with respect toWl is computed
as ∂E∂Wl =
∂E
∂hl+1
·hl. The gradients of Wl are inner products of
the error from the layer above and the features hl. Similarly,
for a convolutional layer, the gradients of the weights are con-
volutions of the error from the layer above and the features hl.
Observations of gradient updates can thus be used to infer fea-
ture values, which are in turn based on the participants’ private
training data.
4.3 Membership inference
As explained above, the non-zero gradients of the embed-
ding layer reveal which words appear in a batch. This helps
infer whether a given text or location appears in the training
dataset or not. Let Vt be the words included in the updates
∆θt. During training, the attacker collects a vocabulary se-
quence [V1, . . . , VT ]. Given a text record r, with words Vr, he
can test if Vr ⊆ Vt, for some t in the vocabulary sequence. If
r is in target’s dataset, then Vr will be included in at least one
vocabulary from the sequence. The adversary can use this to
decide whether r was a member or not.
4.4 Passive property inference
We assume that the adversary has auxiliary data consisting
of the data points that have the property of interest (Dadvprop) and
data points that do not have the property (Dadvnonprop). These data
points need to be sampled from the same class as the target
participant’s data, but otherwise can be unrelated.
The intuition behind our attack is that the adversary can
leverage the snapshots of the global model to generate aggre-
gated updates based on the data with the property and updates
based on the data without the property. This produces labeled
examples, which enable the adversary to train a binary batch
property classifier that determines if the observed updates are
based on the data with or without the property. This attack is
passive, i.e., the adversary observes the updates and performs
inference without changing anything in the local or global col-
laborative training procedure.
Batch property classifier. Algorithm 3 shows how to build a
batch property classifier during collaborative training. Given a
model snapshot θt, calculate gradients gprop based on a batch
with the property badvprop ⊂ Dadvprop and gnonprop based on a batch
without the property badvnonprop ⊂ Dadvnonprop. Once enough labeled
gradients have been collected, train a binary classifier fprop.
For the property inference attacks that exploit the
embedding-layer gradients (e.g., the attack on the Yelp dataset
in Section 6.2), we use a logistic regression classifier. For all
other property inference attacks, we experimented with logis-
tic regression, gradient boosting, and random forests. Random
forests with 50 trees performed the best. The input features
in this case correspond to the observed gradient updates. The
number of the features is thus equal to the model’s parameters,
which can be very large for a realistic model. To downsample
the features representation, we apply the max pooling opera-
tor [21] on the observed gradient updates. More specifically,
max pooling performs a max filter to non-overlapping subre-
gions of the initial features representation, thus reducing the
computational cost of the attack.
Inference algorithm. As collaborative training progresses, the
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Algorithm 3 Batch Property Classifier
Inputs: Attacker’s auxiliary data Dadvprop, Dadvnonprop
Outputs: Batch property classifier fprop
Gprop ← ∅ . Positive training data for property inference
Gnonprop ← ∅ . Negative training data for property inference
for i = 1 to T do
Receive θt from server
Run ClientUpdate(θt)
Sample badvprop ⊂ Dadvprop, badvnonprop ⊂ Dadvnonprop
Calculate gprop = ∇L(badvprop; θt), gnonprop = ∇L(badvnonprop; θt)
Gprop ← Gprop ∪ {gprop}
Gnonprop ← Gnonprop ∪ {gnonprop}
end for
Label Gprop as positive and Gnonprop as negative
Train a binary classifier fprop given Gprop, Gnonprop
adversary observes gradient updates gobs = ∆θt − ∆θadvt .
For single-batch inference, the adversary simply feeds the ob-
served gradient updates to the batch property classifier fprop.
This attack can be extended from single-batch properties to
the target’s entire training dataset. The batch property classifier
fprop outputs a score in [0,1], indicating the probability that a
batch has the property. The adversary can use the average score
across all iterations to decide whether the target’s entire dataset
has the property in question.
4.5 Active property inference
An active adversary can perform a more powerful attack
by using multi-task learning. The adversary extends his local
copy of the collaboratively trained model with an augmented
property classifier connected to the last layer. He trains this
model to simultaneously perform well on the main task and
recognize batch properties. On the training data where each
record has a main label y and a property label p, the model’s
joint loss is calculated as:
Lmt = α · L(x, y; θ) + (1− α) · L(x, p; θ)
During collaborative training, the adversary uploads the up-
dates ∇θLmt based on this joint loss, causing the joint model
to learn separable representations for the data with and with-
out the property. As a result, the gradients will be separable
too (e.g., see Figure 7 in Section 6.5), enabling the adversary
to tell if the training data has the property.
This adversary is still “honest-but-curious” in the crypto-
graphic parlance. He faithfully follows the collaborative learn-
ing protocol and does not submit any malformed messages.
The only difference with the passive attack is that this adver-
sary performs additional local computations and submits the
resulting values into the collaborative learning protocol. Note
that the “honest-but-curious” model does not constrain the par-
ties’ input values, only their messages.
5 Datasets and model architectures
The datasets, collaborative learning tasks, and adversarial in-
ference tasks used in our experiments are reported in Table 1.
Dataset #Records Main tasks Inference tasks
LFW 13.2k Gender/Smile/Age Race/Eyewear
Eyewear/Race/Hair
FaceScrub 18.8k Gender Identity
PIPA 18.0k Age Gender
CSI 1.4k Sentiment Membership,
Region/Gender/Veracity
FourSquare 15.5k Gender Membership
Yelp-health 17.9k Review score Membership,
Doctor specialty
Yelp-author 16.2K Review score Author
Table 1: Datasets and tasks used in our experiments.
Our choices of hyperparameters are based on the standard
models from the ML literature.
Labeled Faces In the Wild (LFW). LFW [28] contains 13,233
62x47 RGB face images for 5,749 individuals with labels such
as gender, race, age, hair color, and eyewear.
FaceScrub. FaceScrub [40] contains 76,541 50x50 RGB im-
ages for 530 individuals with the gender label: 52.5% are la-
beled as male, the rest as female. For our experiments, we
selected a subset of 100 individuals with the most images, for
a total of 18,809 images.
On both LFW and FaceScrub, the collaborative models are
convolutional neural networks (CNN) with three spatial con-
volution layers with 32, 64, and 128 filters, kernel size set to
(3, 3), and max pooling layers with pooling size set to 2, fol-
lowed by two fully connected layers of size 256 and 2. We use
rectified linear unit (ReLU) as the activation function for all
layers. Batch size is 32 (except in the experiments where we
vary it), SGD learning rate is 0.01.
People in Photo Album (PIPA). PIPA [67] contains over
60,000 photos of 2,000 individuals collected from public
Flickr photo albums. Each image includes one or more peo-
ple and is labeled with the number of people and their gender,
age, and race. For our experiments, we selected a subset of
18,000 images with three or fewer people and scaled the raw
images to 128x128.
The collaborative model for PIPA is a VGG-style [54] 10-
layer CNN with two convolution blocks consisting of one con-
volutional layer and max pooling, followed by three convo-
lution blocks consisting of two convolutional layers and max
pooling, followed by two fully connected layers. Batch size is
32, SGD learning rate is 0.01.
Yelp-health. We extracted health care-related reviews from
the Yelp dataset1 of 5 million reviews of businesses tagged
with numeric ratings (1-5) and attributes such as business type
and location. Our subset contains 17,938 reviews for 10 types
of medical specialists.
Yelp-author. We also extracted a Yelp subset with the reviews
of the top 10 most prolific reviewers, 16,207 in total.
On both Yelp datasets, the model is a recurrent neural net-
work with a word-embedding layer of dimension 100. Words
in a review are mapped to a sequence of word-embedding vec-
tors, which is fed to a gated recurrent unit (GRU [10]) layer
1https://www.yelp.com/dataset
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that maps it to a sequence of hidden vectors. We add a fully
connected classification layer to the last hidden vector of the
sequence. SGD learning rate is 0.05.
FourSquare. In [63, 64], Yang et al. collected a global dataset
of FourSquare location “check-ins” (userID, time, location, ac-
tivity) from April 2012 to September 2013. For our experi-
ments, we selected a subset of 15,548 users who checked in at
least 10 different locations in New York City and for whom we
know their gender [65]. This yields 528,878 check-ins. The
model is a gender classifier, a task previously studied by Pang
et al. [44] on similar datasets.
CLiPS Stylometry Investigation (CSI) Corpus. This annu-
ally expanded dataset [60] contains student-written essays and
reviews. We obtained 1,412 reviews, equally split between
Truthful/Deceptive or Positive/Negative and labeled with at-
tributes of the author (gender, age, sexual orientation, region
of origin, personality profile) and the document (timestamp,
genre, topic, veracity, sentiment). 80% of the reviews are writ-
ten by females, 66% by authors from Antwerpen, the rest from
other parts of Belgium and the Netherlands.
On both the FourSquare and CSI datasets, the model, which
is based on [31], first uses an embedding layer to turn non-
negative integers (locations indices and word tokens) into
dense vectors of dimension 320, then applies three spatial con-
volutional layers with 100 filters and variable kernel windows
of size (3, 320), (4, 320) and (5, 320) and max pooling layers
with pooling size set to (l−3, 1), (l−4, 1), and (l−5, 1) where
l is the fixed length to which input sequences are padded. The
hyperparameter l is 300 on CSI and 100 on FourSquare. After
this, the model has two fully connected layers of size 128 and
2 for FourSquare and one fully connected layer of size 2 for
CSI. We use RELU as the activation function. Batch size is
100 for FourSquare, 12 for CSI. SGD learning rate is 0.01.
6 Two-Party Experiments
All experiments were performed on a workstation running
Ubuntu Server 16.04 LTS equipped with a 3.4GHz CPU i7-
6800K, 32GB RAM, and an NVIDIA TitanX GPU card. We
use MxNet [8] and Lasagne [12] to implement deep neural net-
works and Scikit-learn [48] for conventional ML models. The
source code is available upon request. Training our inference
models takes less than 60 seconds on average and does not re-
quire a GPU.
We use AUC scores to evaluate the performance of both the
collaborative model and our property inference attacks. For
membership inference, we report only precision because our
decision rule from Section 4.3 is binary and does not produce
a probability score.
6.1 Membership inference
The adversary first builds a Bag of Words (BoW) represen-
tation for the input whose membership in the target’s training
data he aims to infer. We denote this as the test BoW. During
training, as explained in Section 4.3, the non-zero gradients
of the embedding layer reveal which “words” are present in
Yelp-health FourSquare
Batch Size Precision Batch Size Precision
32 0.92 100 0.99
64 0.84 200 0.98
128 0.75 500 0.91
256 0.66 1,000 0.76
512 0.62 2,000 0.62
Table 2: Precision of membership inference (recall is 1).
Main T. Infer T. Corr. AUC Main T. Infer T. Corr. AUC
Gender Black -0.005 1.0 Gender Sunglasses -0.025 1.0
Gender Asian -0.018 0.93 Gender Eyeglasses 0.157 0.94
Smile Black 0.062 1.0 Smile Sunglasses -0.016 1.0
Smile Asian 0.047 0.93 Smile Eyeglasses -0.083 0.97
Age Black -0.084 1.0 Race Sunglasses 0.026 1.0
Age Asian -0.078 0.97 Race Eyeglasses -0.116 0.96
Eyewear Black 0.034 1.0 Hair Sunglasses -0.013 1.0
Eyewear Asian -0.119 0.91 Hair Eyeglasses 0.139 0.96
Table 3: AUC score of single-batch property inference on LFW. We
also report the Pearson correlation between the main task label and
the property label.
each batch of the target’s data, enabling the adversary to build
a batch BoW. If the test BoW is a subset of the batch BoW, the
adversary infers that the input of interest occurs in the batch.
We evaluate membership inference on the Yelp-health and
FourSquare datasets with the vocabulary of 5,000 most fre-
quent words and 30,000 most popular locations, respectively.
We split the data evenly between the target and the adversary
and train a collaborative model for 3,000 iterations.
Table 2 shows the precision of membership inference for
different batch sizes. As batch size increases, the adversary
observes more words in each batch BoW and the attack pro-
duces more false positives. Recall is always perfect (i.e., no
false negatives) because any true test BoW must be contained
in at least one of the batch BoWs observed by the adversary.
6.2 Single-batch property inference
We call a training batch bnonprop if none of the inputs in it
have the property, bprop otherwise. The adversary aims to iden-
tify which of the batches are bprop. We split the training data
evenly between the target and the adversary and assume that
the same fraction of inputs in both subsets have the property.
During training, 1m of the target’s batches include only inputs
with the property (m = 2 in the following).
LFW. Table 3 reports the results of single-batch property in-
ference on the LFW dataset. We chose properties that are un-
correlated with the main classification label that the collabo-
rative model is trying to learn. The attack has perfect AUC
when the main task is gender classification and the inference
task is “race:black” (the Pearson correlation between these la-
bels is -0.005). The attack also achieves almost perfect AUC
when the main task is “race: black” and the inference task is
“eyewear: sunglasses.” It also performs well on several other
properties, including “eyewear: glasses” when the main task is
“race: Asian.”
These results demonstrate that gradients observed during
training leak more than the characteristic features of each class.
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(a) pool1 (b) pool2 (c) pool3 (d) fc
Figure 3: t-SNE projection of the features from different layers of the joint model on LFW gender classification; hollow circle point is female,
solid triangle point is male, blue point is the property “race: black” and red point is data without the property.
(a) FaceScrub (b) Yelp-author
Figure 4: AUC vs. the fraction of the batch that has the property on FaceScrub and Yelp-author.
In fact, collaborative learning leaks properties of the train-
ing data that are uncorrelated with class membership. To
understand why, we plot the t-SNE projection [59] of the fea-
tures from different layers of the joint model in Figure 3. Ob-
serve that the feature vectors are grouped by property in the
lower layers pool1, pool2 and pool3, and by class label in the
higher layer. Intuitively, the model did not just learn to separate
inputs by class. The lower layers of the model also learned to
separate inputs by various properties that are uncorrelated with
the model’s designated task. Our inference attack exploits this
unintended extra functionality.
Yelp-health. On this dataset, we use review-score classifica-
tion as the main task and the specialty of the doctor being re-
viewed as the property inference task. Obviously, the latter is
more sensitive from the privacy perspective.
We use 3,000 most frequent words in the corpus as the vo-
cabulary and train for 3,000 iterations. Using BoWs from the
embedding-layer gradients, the attack achieves almost perfect
AUC. Table 4 shows the words that have the highest predictive
power in our logistic regression.
Fractional properties. We now attempt to infer that some of
the inputs in a batch have the property. For these experiments,
we use FaceScrub’s top 5 face IDs and Yelp-author (the latter
with the 3,000 most frequent words as the vocabulary). The
model is trained for 3,000 iterations. As before, 1/2 of the
target’s batches include inputs with the property, but here we
vary the fraction of inputs with the property within each such
batch among 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9.
Figure 4 reports the results. On FaceScrub for IDs 0, 1, and
3, AUC scores are above 0.8 even if only 50% of the batch
Health Service Top Words in Positive Class
Obstetricians pregnancy, delivery, women, birth, ultrasound
Pediatricians pediatrics, sick, parents, kid, newborn
Cosmetic Surgeons augmentation, plastic, breast, facial, implants
Cardiologists cardiologist, monitor, bed, heart, ER
Dermatologists acne, dermatologists, mole, cancer, spots
Ophthalmologists vision, LASIK, contacts, lenses, frames
Orthopedists knee, orthopedic, shoulder, injury, therapy
Radiologists imaging, SimonMed, mammogram, CT, MRI
Psychiatrists psychiatrist, mental, Zedek, depression, sessions
Urologists Edgepark, pump, supplies, urologist, kidney
Table 4: Words with the largest positive coefficients in the property
classifier for Yelp-health.
contain that face, i.e., the adversary can successfully infer that
photos of a particular person appear in a batch even though
(a) the model is trained for generic gender classification, and
(b) half of the photos in the batch are of other people. If the
fraction is higher, AUC approaches 1.
On Yelp-author, AUC scores are above 0.95 for all identities
even when the fraction is 0.3, i.e., the attack successfully infers
the authors of reviews even though (a) the model is trained for
generic sentiment analysis, and (b) more than two thirds of the
reviews in the batch are from other authors.
6.3 Inferring when a property occurs
Continuous training, when new training data is added to the
process as it becomes available, presents interesting opportu-
nities for inference attacks. If the occurrences of a property in
the training data can be linked to events outside the training
process, privacy violation is exacerbated. For example, sup-
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(a) PIPA (b) FaceScrub
Figure 5: Inferring occurrence of a single-batch property.
pose a model leaks that a certain third person started appear-
ing in another participant’s training data immediately after that
participant uploaded his photos from a trip.
PIPA. Images in the PIPA dataset have between 1 to 3 faces.
We train the collaborative model to detect if there is a young
adult in the image; the adversary’s inference task is to deter-
mine if people in the image are of the same gender. The latter
property is a stepping stone to inferring social relationships
and thus sensitive. We train the model for 2,500 iterations and
let the batches with the “same gender” property appear in iter-
ations 500 to 1500.
Figure 5a shows, for each iteration, the probability output by
the adversary’s classifier that the batch in that iteration has the
property. The appearance and disappearance of the property in
the training data are clearly visible in the plot.
FaceScrub. For the gender classification model on FaceScrub,
the adversary’s objective is to infer whether and when a cer-
tain person appears in the other participant’s photos. The joint
model is trained for 2,500 iterations. We arrange the target’s
training data so that two specific identities appear during cer-
tain iterations: ID 0 in iterations 0 to 500 and 1500 to 2000, ID
1 in iterations 500 to 1000 and 2000 to 2500. The rest of the
batches are mixtures of other identities. The adversary trains
three property classifiers, for ID 0, ID 1, and also for ID 2
which does not appear in the target’s dataset.
Figure 5b reports the scores of all three classifiers. ID 0
and 1 receive the highest scores in the iterations where they
appear, whereas ID 2, which never appears in the training data,
receives very low scores in all iterations.
These experiments show that our attacks can successfully
infer dynamic properties of the training dataset as collaborative
learning progresses.
6.4 Inference against well-generalized models
To show that our attacks work with (1) relatively few ob-
served model updates and (2) against well-generalized mod-
els, we experiment with the CSI corpus. Figure 6 reports the
accuracy of inferring the author’s gender. The attack reaches
0.98 AUC after only 2 epochs and improves as the training
progresses and the adversary collects more updates.
Figure 6 also shows that the model is not overfitted. Its test
accuracy on the main sentiment-analysis task is high and im-
proves with the number of the epochs.
Figure 6: Attack performance with respect to the number of collabo-
rative learning epochs.
6.5 Active property inference
To show the additional power of the active attack from Sec-
tion 4.5, we use FaceScrub. The main task is gender classifi-
cation, the adversary’s task is to infer the presence of ID 4 in
the training data. We assume that this ID occurs in a single
batch, where it constitutes 50% of the photos. We evaluate the
attack with different choices of α, which controls the balance
between the main-task loss and the property-classification loss
in the adversary’s objective function.
Figure 7a shows that AUC increases as we increase α. Fig-
ure 7b and Figure 7c show the t-SNE projection of the final
fully connected layer, with α = 0 and α = 0.7, respectively.
Observe that the data with the property (blue points) is grouped
tighter when α = 0.7 than in the model trained under a passive
attack (α = 0). This illustrates that as a result of the active
attack, the joint model learns a better separation for data with
and without the property.
7 Multi-Party Experiments
In the multi-party setting, we only consider passive property
inference attacks. We vary the number of participants be-
tween 4 and 30 to match the deployment scenarios and ap-
plications proposed for collaborative learning, e.g., hospitals
or biomedical research institutions training on private medical
data [29, 30]. This is similar to prior work [25], which was
evaluated on MNIST with 2 participants and face recognition
on the AT&T dataset with 41 participants.
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(a) ROC for different α (b) t-SNE of the final layer for α = 0 (c) t-SNE of the final layer for α = 0.7.
Figure 7: Two-party active property inference attack on FaceScrub. For (b) and (c), hollow circle point is female, solid triangle point is male,
blue point is the property “ID 4” and red point is data without the property.
(a) LFW (b) Yelp-author
Figure 8: Multi-party learning with synchronized SGD: attack AUC score vs. the number of participants.
7.1 Synchronized SGD
As the number of honest participants in collaborative learn-
ing increases, the adversary’s task becomes harder because the
observed gradient updates are aggregated across multiple par-
ticipants. Furthermore, the inferred information may not di-
rectly reveal the identity of the participant to whom the data
belongs (see Section 9.4).
In the following experiments, we split the training data
evenly across all participants, but so that only the target and
the adversary have the data with the property. The joint model
is trained with the same hyperparameters as in the two-party
case. Similar to Section 6.2, the adversary’s goal is to identify
which aggregated gradient updates are based on batches bprop
with the property.
LFW. We experiment with (1) gender classification as the
main task and “race: black” as the inference task, and (2)
smile classification as the main task and “eyewear: sunglasses”
as the inference task. Figure 8a shows that the attack still
achieves reasonably high performance, with AUC score around
0.8, when the number of participants is 12. Performance then
degrades for both tasks.
Yelp-author. The inference task is again author identification.
In the multi-party case, the gradients of the embedding layer
leak the batch BoWs of all honest participants, not just the tar-
get. Figure 8b reports the results. For some authors, AUC
scores do not degrade significantly even with many partici-
pants. This is likely due to some unique combinations of words
used by these authors, which identify them even in multi-party
settings.
7.2 Model averaging
In every round t of federated learning with model averag-
ing (see Algorithm 2), the adversary observes θt − θt−1 =∑
k
nk
n θ
k
t −
∑
k
nk
n θ
k
t−1 =
∑
k
nk
n (θ
k
t −θkt−1), where θkt −θkt−1
are the aggregated gradients computed on the k-th participant’s
local dataset.
In our experiments, we split the training data evenly among
honest participants but ensure that in the target participant’s
subset, pˆ% of the inputs have the property, while none of the
other honest participants’ data have it. During each epoch of
local training, every honest participant splits his local training
data into 10 batches and performs one round of training.
We assume that the adversary has the same number of inputs
with the property as the target. As before, when the adversary
trains his binary classifier, he needs to locally “emulate” the
collaborative training process, i.e., sample data from his local
dataset, compute aggregated updates, and learn to distinguish
between the aggregates based on the data without the property
and aggregates where one of the underlying updates was based
on the data with the property.
We perform 8 trials where a subset of the training data has
the property and 8 control trials where there are no training
inputs with the property.
Inferring presence of a face. We use FaceScrub and select
two face IDs (1 and 3) whose presence we want to infer. In
the “property” case, pˆ = 80%, i.e., 80% of one honest partici-
pant’s training data consist of the photos that depict the person
in question. In the control case, pˆ = 0%, i.e., the photos of
this person do not occur in the training data. Figure 9 shows
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(a) Face ID 1, K = 3 (b) Face ID 1, K = 5 (c) Face ID 3, K = 3 (d) Face ID 3, K = 5
Figure 9: Multi-party learning with model averaging. Box plots show the distribution of the adversary’s scores in each trial: in the 8 trials on
the left, one participant’s data has the property; in the 8 trials on the right, none of the honest participants have the data with the property.
Figure 10: Inferring that a participant whose local data has the prop-
erty of interest has joined the training. K = 2 for rounds 0 to 250,
K = 3 for rounds 250 to 500.
the scores assigned by the adversary’s classifier to the aggre-
gated updates with 3 and 5 total participants. When the face in
question is present in the training dataset, the scores are much
higher than when it is absent.
Success of the attack depends on the property being inferred,
distribution of the data across participants, and other factors.
For example, the classifiers for Face IDs 2 and 4, which were
trained in the same fashion as the classifiers for Face IDs 1 and
3, failed to infer the presence of the corresponding faces in the
training data.
Inferring when a face occurs. In this experiment, we aim to
infer when a participant whose local data has a certain prop-
erty joined collaborative training. We first let the adversary
and the rest of the honest participants train the joint model for
250 rounds. The target participant then joins the training at
round t = 250 with the local data that consists of photos de-
picting ID 1. Figure 10 reports the results of the experiment:
the adversary’s AUC scores are around 0 when face ID 1 is not
present and then increase almost to 1.0 right after the target
participant joins the training.
8 Defenses
8.1 Sharing fewer gradients
As suggested in [52], participants in collaborative learning
could share only a fraction of their gradients during each up-
date. This reduces communication overhead and, potentially,
leakage, since the adversary observes fewer gradients.
To evaluate this defense, we measure the performance of
single-batch inference against a sentiment classifier collabora-
tively trained on the CSI Corpus by two parties who exchange
only a fraction of their gradients. Table 5 shows the resulting
Property / % parameters update 10% 50% 100%
Top region (Antwerpen) 0.84 0.86 0.93
Gender 0.90 0.91 0.93
Veracity 0.94 0.99 0.99
Table 5: Inference attacks against the CSI Corpus for different frac-
tions of gradients shared during training.
Figure 11: Uniqueness of user profiles with respect to the number of
top locations.
AUC scores: when inferring the region of the texts’ authors,
our attack still achieves 0.84 AUC when only 10% of the up-
dates are shared during each iteration, compared to 0.93 AUC
when all updates are shared.
8.2 Dimensionality reduction
As discussed in Section 4.2, if the input space of the model is
sparse and inputs must be embedded into a lower-dimensional
space, non-zero gradient updates in the embedding layer reveal
which inputs are present in the training batch.
One plausible defense is to only use inputs that occur many
times in the training data. This does not work in general, e.g.,
Figure 11 shows that restricting inputs to the top locations in
the FourSquare dataset eliminates most of the training data.
A smarter defense is to restrict the model so that it only uses
“words” from a pre-defined vocabulary of common words. For
example, Google’s federated learning for predictive keyboards
uses a fixed vocabulary of 5,000 words [35]. In Table 6, we re-
port the accuracy of our membership inference attack and the
accuracy of the joint model on its main task—gender classifi-
cation for the FourSquare dataset, sentiment analysis for the
CSI Corpus—for different sizes of the common vocabulary
(locations and words, respectively). This approach partially
mitigates our attacks but also has a significant negative impact
on the quality of the collaboratively trained models.
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CSI FourSquare
Top N Attack Model Top N Attack Model
words Precision AUC locations Precision AUC
4,000 0.94 0.91 30,000 0.91 0.64
2,000 0.92 0.87 10,000 0.86 0.59
1,000 0.92 0.85 3,000 0.65 0.51
500 0.82 0.84 1,000 0.52 0.50
Table 6: Membership inference against the CSI Corpus and
FourSquare for different vocabulary sizes.
8.3 Dropout
Another possible defense is to employ dropout [56], a popu-
lar regularization technique used to mitigate overfitting in neu-
ral networks. Dropout randomly deactivates activations be-
tween neurons, with probability pdrop ∈ [0, 1]. Random de-
activations may weaken our attacks because the adversary ob-
serves fewer gradients corresponding to the active neurons.
To evaluate this approach, we add dropout after the max pool
layers in the joint model. Table 7 reports the accuracy of infer-
ring the region of the reviews in the CSI Corpus, for different
values of pdrop. Increasing the randomness of dropout makes
our attacks stronger while slightly decreasing the accuracy of
the joint model. Dropout stochastically removes features at
every collaborative training step, thus yielding more informa-
tive features (similar to feature bagging [7, 26]) and increasing
variance between participants’ updates.
8.4 Participant-level differential privacy
As discussed in Section 2.2, record-level ε-differential pri-
vacy, by definition, bounds the success of membership infer-
ence but does not prevent property inference. Any application
of differential privacy entails application-specific tradeoffs be-
tween privacy of the training data and accuracy of the resulting
model. The participants must also somehow choose the param-
eters (e.g., ε) that control this tradeoff.
In theory, participant-level differential privacy bounds the
success of inference attacks described in this paper. We
implemented the participant-level differentially private fed-
erated learning algorithm by McMahan et al. [36] and at-
tempted to train a gender classifier on LFW, but the model
did not converge for any number of participants (we tried
at most 30). This is due to the magnitude of noise needed
to achieve differential privacy with the moments accountant
bound [1], which is inversely proportional to the number of
users (the model in [36] was trained on thousands of users).
Another participant-level differential privacy mechanism, pre-
sented in [20], also requires a very large number of partici-
pants. Moreover, these two mechanisms have been used, re-
spectively, for language modeling [36] and handwritten digit
recognition [20]. Adapting them to the specific models and
tasks considered in this paper may not be straightforward.
Following [20, 36], we believe that participant-level differ-
ential privacy provide reasonable accuracy only in settings in-
volving at least thousands of participants. We believe that
further work is needed to investigate whether participant-level
differential privacy can be adapted to prevent our inference at-
tacks and obtain high-quality models in settings that do not
involve thousands of users.
Dropout Prob. Attack AUC Model AUC
0.1 0.94 0.87
0.3 0.97 0.87
0.5 0.98 0.87
0.7 0.99 0.86
0.9 0.99 0.84
Table 7: Inference of the top region (Antwerpen) on the CSI Corpus
for different values of dropout probability.
9 Limitations of the attacks
9.1 Auxiliary data
Our property inference attacks assume that the adversary has
auxiliary training data correctly labeled with the property he
wants to infer. For generic properties, such data is easy to
find. For example, the auxiliary data for inferring the num-
ber and genders of people can be any large dataset of images
with males and females, single and in groups, where each im-
age is labeled with the number of people in it and their genders.
Similarly, the auxiliary data for inferring the medical specialty
of doctors can consist of any texts that include words charac-
teristic of different specialties (see Table 4).
More targeted inference attacks require specialized auxiliary
data that may not be available to the adversary. For example,
to infer that photos of a certain person occurs in another partic-
ipant’s dataset, the adversary needs (possibly different) photos
of that person to train on. To infer the authorship of training
texts, the adversary needs a sufficiently large sample of texts
known to be written by a particular author.
9.2 Number of participants
In our experiments, the number of participants in collabo-
rative training is relatively small (ranging from 2 to 30), while
some federated-learning applications involve thousands or mil-
lions of users [35, 36]. As discussed in Section 7.1, perfor-
mance of our attacks drops significantly as the number of par-
ticipants increases.
9.3 Undetectable properties
It may not be possible to infer some properties from model
updates. For example, our attack did not detect the presence
of some face identities in the multi-party model averaging ex-
periments (Section 7.2). If for whatever reason the model does
not internally separate the features associated with the target
property, inference will fail.
9.4 Attribution of inferred properties
In the two-party scenarios considered in Section 6, attribu-
tion of the inferred properties is trivial because there is only
one honest participant. In the multi-party scenarios considered
in Section 7, model updates are aggregated. Therefore, even
if the adversary successfully infers the presence of inputs with
a certain property in the training data, he may not be able to
attribute these inputs to a specific participant. Furthermore, he
may not be able to tell if all inputs with the property belong to
one participant or are distributed across multiple participants.
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In general, attribution requires auxiliary information specific
to the leakage. For example, consider face identification. In
some applications of collaborative learning, the identities of
all participants are known because they need to communicate
with each other. If collaborative learning leaks that a particular
person appears in the training images, auxiliary information
about the participants (e.g., their social networks) can reveal
which of them knows the person in question. Similarly, if col-
laborative learning leaks the authorship of the training texts,
auxiliary information can help infer which participant is likely
to train on texts written by this author.
Another example of attribution based on auxiliary informa-
tion is described in Section 6.3. If photos of a certain per-
son first appear in the training data after a new participant has
joined collaborative training, the adversary may attribute these
photos to the new participant.
Note that leakage of medical conditions, locations, images
of individuals, or texts written by known authors is a privacy
breach even if it cannot be traced to a specific participant or
multiple participants. Leaking that a certain person appears in
the photos or just the number of people in the photos reveals
intimate relationships between people. Locations can reveal
people’s addresses, religion, sexual orientation, and relation-
ships with other people.
10 Related Work
Privacy-preserving distributed learning. Transfer learning in
combination with differentially private (DP) techniques tai-
lored for deep learning [1] has been used in [45, 46]. These
techniques privately train a “student” model by transferring,
through noisy aggregation, the knowledge of an ensemble
of “teachers” trained on the disjoint subsets of training data.
These are centralized, record-level DP mechanisms with a
trusted aggregator and do not apply to federated or collabora-
tive learning. In particular, [45, 46] assume that the adversary
cannot see the individual models, only the final model trained
by the trusted aggregator. Moreover, record-level DP by def-
inition does not prevent property inference. Finally, their ef-
fectiveness has been demonstrated only on a few specific tasks
(MNIST, SVHN, OCR), which are substantially different from
the tasks considered in this paper.
Shokri and Shmatikov [52] propose making gradient up-
dates differentially private to protect the training data. Their
approach requires extremely large values of the ε parameter
(and consequently little privacy protection) to produce an ac-
curate joint model. More recently, participant-level differen-
tially private federated learning methods [20, 36] showed how
to protect participants’ training data by adding Gaussian noise
to local updates. As discussed in Section 8.4, these approaches
require a large number of users (on the order of thousands)
for the training to converge and achieve an acceptable trade-
off between privacy and model performance. Furthermore, the
results in [36] are reported for a specific language model and
use AccuracyTop1 as the proxy, not the actual accuracy of the
non-private model.
Pathak et al. [47] present a differentially private global clas-
sifier hosted by a trusted third-party and based on locally
trained classifiers held by separate, mutually distrusting par-
ties. Hamm et al. [23] use knowledge transfer to combine a
collection of models trained on individual devices into a single
model, with differential privacy guarantees.
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) has also been used
to build privacy-preserving neural networks in a distributed
fashion. For example, SecureML [37] starts with the data own-
ers (clients) distributing their private training inputs among
two non-colluding servers during the setup phase; the two
servers then use MPC to train a global model on the clients’
encrypted joint data. Bonawitz et al. [5] use secure multi-party
aggregation techniques, tailored for federated learning, to let
participants encrypt their updates so that the central parameter
server only recovers the sum of the updates. In Section 7.2,
we showed that inference attacks can be successful even if the
adversary only observes aggregated updates.
Membership inference. Prior work demonstrated the feasi-
bility of membership inference from aggregate statistics, e.g.,
in the context of genomic studies [3, 27], location time-
series [50], or noisy statistics in general [14].
Membership inference against black-box ML models has
also been studied extensively in recent work. Shokri et al. [53]
demonstrate membership inference against black-box super-
vised models, exploiting the differences in the models’ outputs
on training and non-training inputs. Hayes et al. [24] focus
on generative models in machine-learning-as-a-service appli-
cations and train GANs [22] to detect overfitting and recognize
training inputs. Long et al. [34] and Yeom et al. [66] study the
relationship between overfitting and information leakage.
Truex et al. [58] extend [53] to a more general setting and
show how membership inference attacks are data-driven and
largely transferable. They also show that an adversary who
participates in collaborative learning, with access to individ-
ual model updates from all honest participants, can boost the
performance of membership inference vs. a centralized model.
Nasr et al. [39] design a privacy mechanism to adversarially
train centralized machine learning models with provable pro-
tections against membership inference.
Other attacks on machine learning models. Several tech-
niques infer class features and/or construct class representa-
tives if the adversary has black-box [16, 17] or white-box [2]
access to a classifier model. As discussed in detail in Section 3,
these techniques infer features that characterize an entire class
and not specifically the training data, except in the cases of
pathological overfitting where the training sample constitutes
the entire membership of the class.
Hitaj et al. [25] show that a participant in collaborative
deep learning can use GANs to construct class representatives.
Their technique was evaluated only on models where all mem-
bers of the same class are visually similar (handwritten dig-
its and faces). As discussed in Section 3.1, there is no evi-
dence that it produces actual training images or can distinguish
a training image and another image from the same class.
The informal property violated by the attacks of [2, 16, 17,
25] is: “a classifier should prevent users from generating an
input that belongs to a particular class or even learning what
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such an input looks like.” It is not clear to us why this property
is desirable, or whether it is even achievable.
Aono et al. [49] show that, in the collaborative deep learning
protocol of [52], an honest-but-curious server can partially re-
cover participants’ training inputs from their gradient updates
under the (greatly simplified) assumption that the batch con-
sists of a single input. Furthermore, the technique is evaluated
only on MNIST where all class members are visually similar.
It is not clear if it can distinguish a training image and another
image from the same MNIST class.
Song et al. [55] engineer an ML model that memorizes the
training data, which can then be extracted with black-box ac-
cess to the model. Carlini et al. [6] show that deep learning-
based generative sequence models trained on text data can un-
intentionally memorize training inputs, which can then be ex-
tracted with black-box access. They do this for sequences of
digits artificially introduced into the text, which are not af-
fected by the relative word frequencies in the language model.
Training data that is explicitly incorporated or otherwise
memorized in the model can also be leaked by model stealing
attacks [41, 57, 61].
Concurrently with this work, Ganju et al. [18] developed
property inference attacks against fully connected, relatively
shallow neural networks. They focus on the post-training,
white-box release of models trained on sensitive data, as op-
posed to collaborative training. In contrast to our attacks, the
properties inferred in [18] may be correlated with the main
task. Evaluation is limited to simple datasets and tasks such as
MNIST, U.S. Census tabular data, and hardware performance
counters with short features.
11 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed and evaluated several inference at-
tacks against collaborative learning. These attacks enable a
malicious participant to infer not only membership, i.e., the
presence of exact data points in other participants’ training
data, but also properties that characterize subsets of the train-
ing data and are independent of the properties that the joint
model aims to capture.
Deep learning models appear to internally recognize many
features of the data that are uncorrelated with the tasks they
are being trained for. Consequently, model updates during col-
laborative learning leak information about these “unintended”
features to adversarial participants. Active attacks are poten-
tially very powerful in this setting because they enable the ad-
versary to trick the joint model into learning features of the ad-
versary’s choosing without a significant impact on the model’s
performance on its main task.
Our results suggest that leakage of unintended features ex-
poses collaborative learning to powerful inference attacks. We
also showed that defenses such as selective gradient sharing,
reducing dimensionality, and dropout are not effective. This
should motivate future work on better defenses. For instance,
techniques that learn only the features relevant to a given
task [15, 42, 43] can potentially serve as the basis for “least-
privilege” collaboratively trained models. Further, it may be
possible to detect active attacks that manipulate the model into
learning extra features. Finally, it remains an open question
if participant-level differential privacy mechanisms can pro-
duce accurate models when collaborative learning involves rel-
atively few participants.
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